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Resumo	Como	 o	 direito	 ao	 esquecimento	 pode	 ser	 entendido	 no	 contexto	 atual	determinado	pela	sociedade	digital?	Acima	de	tudo,	ele	é	capaz	de	proteger	adequadamente	 a	 pessoa	 da	 difusão	 e	 da	 memória	 perene	 da	 web?	 Este	trabalho	 analisa	 a	 questão	 examinando	 a	 evolução	 da	 jurisprudência	 da	União	Europeia	desde	o	caso	Google	Espanha	e,	em	uma	base	comparativa,	descrevendo	a	situação	atual	nos	Estados	Unidos.	
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Abstract	How	 can	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 current	 context	determined	by	the	digital	society?	Above	all	is	able	to	adequately	protect	the	person	from	the	pervasiveness	and	perennial	memory	of	the	web?	This	work	analyses	 the	 question	 by	 examining	 the	 evolution	 of	 European	 Union’s	Jurisprudence	 since	 the	Google	 Spain	 case	 and,	 on	 a	 comparative	 basis,	 by	outlining	the	current	situation	in	the	United	States.	
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Origin	and	nature		 The	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 is	 a	 theme	 strictly	 connected	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	memory	and	personal	 identity,	which	has	crossed	society	since	 its	origins,	but	 today	 finds	a	very	particular	emphasis	due	 to	 the	enormous	development	of	network	 technologies	and	 to	the	possibility	of	storing	the	information.	The	 role	 of	memory	 in	 ensuring	 the	 preservation	 of	 traditions	 and	 the	 development	 of	societies	 has	 certainly	 been	 a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 progress,	 but	 technological	 evolution	has	led	to	a	reversal	of	what	for	a	long	time	has	been	the	relationship	between	memory	and	oblivion,	since	today,	contrary	to	past	times,	it	can	certainly	be	affirmed	that	remembering	is	the	rule,	while	forgetting	is	the	exception.	(Mayer-Schönberger,	2016,	p.	2)	The	advent	and	evolution	of	the	internet	and	the	web	have	in	fact	brought	about	epochal	transformations	not	only	in	the	world	of	communication	and	instantaneous	information,	but	also	in	the	one	of	the	conservation	of	the	data	entered,	contributing	to	the	creation	of	a	space	tending	to	store	and	retaining	any	type	of	information	for	an	indefinite	and	even	permanent	time.	 To	 describe	 this	 phenomenon,	 the	 doctrine	 has	 already	 coined	 some	 expressions	 that	have	 become	 emblematic	 of	 the	 potentially	 indelible	 character	 of	 any	 information	 that	 is	placed	on	the	internet	and	of	the	nature	of	the	medium	capable	of	remembering	forever	that	the	latter	covers	(see	Acar;	Eubank;	Englehardt;	Juarez;	Narayanan;	Diaz,	2014).	However,	this	fact	represents	a	not	entirely	desirable	effect	of	technological	progress,	firstly	from	a	human	point	of	view	and	then	also	from	a	juridical	one.		In	this	regard,	as	pointed	out	by	some	scholars,	it	is	sufficient	to	mention	the	case	of	the	literary	character	named	Funes,	described	by	the	writer	Borges	(See	Zanichelli,	2016,	p.	25),	to	understand	how	the	excess	of	memory	can	constitute	an	 impediment	 to	 the	conduct	of	a	normal	 life,	as	 it	causes	an	 imprisonment	of	one	person's	mind	 in	his	own	memories	and	 in	the	smallest	details	of	what	he	perceives,	without	having	 the	opportunity	 to	select	 the	most	relevant	aspects	of	life	experiences	and	therefore	to	understand	them	and	give	them	meaning.		In	this	specific	case,	albeit	with	some	dramatic	emphasis,	seems	to	describe	well	 the	danger	faced	by	a	society	that	 is	no	longer	able	to	forget,	such	as	today's	dominated	by	the	internet	and	the	web.	However,	the	greatest	risk	seems	to	lie	not	so	much	in	the	loss	of	the	ability	to	deselect	 the	 information,	 but	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 update	 the	 selection	 initially	made.	 From	 this	point	of	view,	 the	dissemination	of	 information	 through	the	web	 is	placed	 in	a	mostly	static	dimension	in	which	the	dynamic	aspect	of	the	change	in	the	data	of	the	reality	represented	is	not	a	 fact	that	 is	 immediately	and	necessarily	perceptible,	how	much	the	result	of	a	work	of	research	 and	 reconstruction	 and	 comparison	 by	 the	 user	who	 comes	 into	 contact	with	 the	aforementioned	 information.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 has	 been	 rightly	 stated	 that	 the	 web	 is	presented	not	so	much	as	an	archive	of	information	in	which	it	is	ordered	and	related	to	each	other	 according	 to	 logical	 or	 scientific	 criteria,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 repository	 of	 data	 that	 is	inserted	according	to	a	mostly	cumulative	and	non-selective	process.	The	cancellation	of	the	space-time	dimension	of	 the	network	 therefore	makes	 it	 difficult	 in	 itself	 to	 trace	 the	 exact	chronological	sequence	of	events	described	in	the	information	entered,	on	the	contrary,	they	all	 appear	 to	 be	 placed	 in	 a	 dimension	 of	 "eternal	 present"	 devoid	 of	 that	 element	 of	dynamism	that	inevitably	distinguishes	the	facts	of	real	life.	This	feature	of	the	web	poses	a	series	of	problems	from	a	legal	point	of	view,	as	it	comes	into	 conflict	 with	 fundamental	 principles	 and	 values	 of	 the	 person	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	formation	 of	 subjective	 identity	 and	 its	 correct	 representation	 towards	 third	 parties.	 In	response	to	these	pressing	questions,	the	world	of	law	has	over	time	elaborated	and	led	to	the	
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affirmation	 in	the	positive	systems	of	 the	right	 to	be	 forgotten,	which	today	 is	not	expressly	regulated	by	the	rules	in	force	in	most	countries	that	recognize	it,	but	constitutes	the	object	of	a	 formulation	 jurisprudential,	 which	 however	 proves	 to	 be	 of	 fundamental	 importance	 in	defining	the	relationship	between	freedom	of	information	and	the	right	to	privacy.	In	 fact,	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 certainly	 belongs	 to	 the	 field	 of	 rights	 attributable	 to	privacy,	which	cannot	be	identified	as	a	single	and	well-defined	right,	but	rather	as	a	complex	of	 rights	 relating	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	 a	 person's	 private	 life,	 which	 can	 roughly	 be	 made	 to	coincide	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 "confidentiality".	 Indeed,	 from	 this	 specific	 point	 of	 view,	 the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	certainly	the	most	typical	expression	of	the	legal	concept	of	privacy,	as	it	translates	that	idea	of	"right	to	be	forgotten"	and	“right	to	be	let	alone”	which	are	the	basis	of	the	modern	theory	of	the	right	to	privacy.		However,	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 in	 framing	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 property	 subject	 to	protection	in	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	as	most	scholars	prefer	to	bring	it	back	to	the	sphere	of	personal	 identity	 instead	 of	 the	 one	 more	 properly	 linked	 to	 the	 right	 to	 privacy.	 (Rosen,	2012)	 The	 evolution	 that	 has	 been	 recorded	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 law	 at	 the	jurisprudential	 level	 undoubtedly	 contributes	 to	 this	 opinion,	 where	 the	 protection	 of	 the	right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 has	 been	 progressively	 and	 partially	 released	 from	 the	 concept	 of	confidentiality	 of	 the	 data	 to	 refer	 it	 rather	 to	 its	 identification	 value.	 Based	 on	 this	reconstruction,	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	therefore	recognized	not	so	much	in	relation	to	the	intimate	 or	 personal	 nature	 of	 the	 data	 that	 is	 disseminated,	 but	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 lack	 of	representativeness	 of	 the	 data	 itself	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 current	 identity	 of	 the	 person	concerned.	 In	 these	 terms,	 the	right	 to	be	 forgotten	comes	to	be	configured	as	a	personality	right	 in	 the	proper	 sense,	 as	 it	 aims	 to	protect	 that	heritage	of	 ideas,	 references	 and	values	that	 contribute	 to	 identifying	 the	 personality	 of	 the	 person	 concerned,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	publication	of	information	that	no	longer	reflects	its	current	profile.	According	to	a	definition	given	 by	 jurisprudence	 (Cass.,	 09/04/1998,	 n.	 3679)	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 shall	 be	constructed	 as	 “the	 justified	 interest	 of	 every	 person	 not	 to	 remain	 indefinitely	 exposed	 to	
further	 damage	 that	 causes	 his	 honor	 and	 reputation	 to	 be	 repeatedly	 published	 in	 the	 past	
legitimately	 disclosed	 news”.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 preserves	 the	 personal	identity	of	the	person	concerned	in	his	subjective	aspect,	that	is	linked	to	honor	and	objective	and	 reputation.	 However,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 and	 personal	identity	 is	 characterized	 in	 a	 dynamic	 sense,	 by	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 the	 process	 of	forming	personal	identity	and	its	susceptibility	to	change.	From	this	point	of	view,	the	subject	of	protection	is	not	so	much	the	perception	that	the	interested	party	has	his	own	identity,	but	rather	his	actual	and	actual	manifestation	 towards	 third	parties.	 	 In	hindsight,	however,	 the	strict	inherence	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	for	the	sake	of	personal	identity	does	not	exclude	its	referability	to	the	sphere	of	the	right	to	privacy,	in	fact	in	some	ways	it	presupposes	it.		Protecting	the	current	identity	of	the	data	subject	with	respect	to	facts	of	the	past	that	are	no	 longer	 representative	 of	 the	 same,	 in	 fact	means	making	 the	 facts	 themselves	 no	 longer	known	by	the	public,	or	preventing	them	from	being	associated	with	his	person.	In	this	sense,	it	seems	impossible	to	conceive	a	right	to	be	forgotten	without	making	necessary	reference	to	the	 right	 to	 privacy,	 which	 is	 substantiated	 precisely	 in	 the	 claim	 to	 subtract	 from	 the	knowledge	 of	 third	 parties	 facts	 that	 pertain	 to	 the	 personal	 sphere	 of	 the	 interested	party	and	that	affect	his	image	towards	third	parties.	In	this	key,	the	right	to	be	forgotten	certainly	also	protects	the	data	subject's	right	to	privacy,	indeed,	according	to	an	expression	dear	to	the	doctrine	 it	 represents	 an	 instrument	 of	 protection	 of	 “historical	 privacy”	 (see	 Mezzanotte,	2009;	 Martinelli,	 2017,	 p.	 91),	 where	 privacy	 assumes	 the	 character	 of	 both	 an	 object	protected	and	an	instrument	for	its	realization.	
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The	right	to	be	forgotten	from	the	web:	from	the	Google	Spain	ruling	
to	the	European	Regulation	n.	679/2016	(GDPR)		 In	 the	 current	panorama	of	 the	media,	 a	 certainly	 central	 role	 is	played	by	 the	 services	and	 channels	 offered	 by	 the	 internet	 and	 the	web,	which	 today	 are	 certainly	 the	 vehicle	 of	greatest	 diffusion	 and	 influence	 within	 the	 communities	 at	 a	 global	 level.	 The	 current	centrality	 of	 information	 channels	 linked	 to	 the	 Internet	 is	 such	 that	 traditional	media	 are	now	relegated	to	a	role	no	longer	prominent	as	 in	the	past,	on	the	contrary,	 they	are	visibly	downsized	with	respect	to	the	pervasiveness	and	influence	possessed	by	the	new	media.		There	is	no	doubt	that	the	possibility	offered	to	users	of	the	new	means	of	being	able	to	proceed	personally	to	make	information	through	the	use	of	various	tools	such	as	blogs,	social	networks	and	personal	pages	that	have	attracted	along	the	way	has	contributed	to	the	change.	an	increasing	attention	precisely	because	of	the	more	direct	involvement	of	individuals	in	the	process	 of	 creating	 and	 processing	 information.	 The	 general	 change	 in	 the	 way	 of	communicating	and	informing	has	not	failed	to	have	significant	repercussions	on	the	world	of	law	 as	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 new	 scenarios	 proposed	 by	 technologies	 many	 of	 the	 traditional	categories	 have	 had	 to	 be	 rethought,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 usual	 forms	 of	 protection	 have	 had	 to	compete	with	completely	new	and	original	issues	and	problems.	The	same	original	concept	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	has	no	longer	proved	able	to	respond	to	the	protection	needs	arising	from	 emerging	 cases	 in	 the	 sector	 of	 new	 technologies,	 that	 so	many	 elements	 of	 diversity	present	with	 respect	 to	 traditional	 information	and	communication	 tools.	The	 initial	 idea	of	oblivion	as	the	right	to	obtain	the	deletion	of	information	or	to	prevent	the	new	dissemination	or	 republication	 of	 the	 same	 which	 presented	 an	 injurious	 character	 and	 no	 longer	responding	 to	 the	 personality	 of	 the	 interested	 party,	 in	 fact,	 it	 proved	 to	 be	 no	 longer	adequate	 to	 ensure	 suitable	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 web	 and	 internet-related	technologies.		The	 concrete	 impossibility	 of	 ensuring	 the	 complete	 elimination	 from	 the	 web	 of	information	no	 longer	 related	 to	 the	present,	has	necessarily	 led	 to	 seek	 the	 solution	 to	 the	expectations	 of	 protection	 of	 the	 interested	 parties	 directly	 calling	 into	 question	 the	responsibility	of	 intermediaries	such	as	service	providers	and	of	content,	 in	an	autonomous	form	and	no	longer	exclusively	concurrent	with	respect	to	that	of	online	publishers	and	more	generally	 of	 the	managers	 of	 the	 sites	 for	 publishing	 the	 information	 or	 the	 authors	 of	 the	same.			The	difficulty	of	 controlling	 the	circulation	of	 information	once	 it	 is	entered	on	 the	web	has	imposed	the	overcoming	of	the	limits	and	conditions	to	which	the	right	to	delete	data	was	subject,	in	favor	of	an	approach	more	inclined	to	identify	alternative	and	concurrent	forms	of	protection,	although	less	radical	than	the	aforementioned	law.	In	this	perspective,	the	right	to	be	forgotten	on	the	web,	sanctioned	for	the	first	time	by	the	Google	Spain	judgment	rendered	by	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union,	represented	the	most	evident	example	of	 the	adaptation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 new	 technological	 realities	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 relativization	 of	protection,	in	the	face	of	the	increasingly	frequent	impossibility	of	guaranteeing	absolute	and	complete	 protection	 in	 practice.	 The	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 resulting	 from	 the	 Google	 Spain	judgment	is	in	fact	nothing	more	than	a	right	of	cancellation	in	the	form	of	the	so-called	right	to	 de-index	 the	 information,	which	 is	 substantiated	 in	 the	 claim	 for	 the	 interested	 party	 to	have	 removed	 from	 the	 list	 of	 results	 returned	 by	 the	 search	 engine	 starting	 from	 the	insertion	of	his	name,	of	all	links	to	news	and	information	that	no	longer	present	a	connection	
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with	 the	 present	 and	with	 its	 current	 identity.	 The	 right	 to	 de-indexing	 therefore	 does	 not	involve	an	elimination	of	information	from	its	sources,	but	only	the	removal	from	the	search	engine	results	of	links	to	news	and	data	that	are	no	longer	current.		This	circumstance	means	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	online	is	configured	not	as	a	right	to	the	complete	elimination	of	information	from	the	context	of	the	web,	but	as	a	right	to	less	visibility	in	accepting	an	attenuated	version	of	the	concept	of	forgetfulness	that	the	term	itself	evokes.	 The	 practical	 effect	 of	 de-indexing	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 to	 make	 the	 news	 or	 information	subject	 to	 it	untraceable,	but	simply	to	make	them	less	easily	 traceable	within	the	web.	One	might	think	that	there	is	a	fictitious	protection,	but	in	reality	this	is	not	the	case,	since	almost	all	the	information	that	is	found	on	the	web	is	obtained	starting	from	specific	searches	carried	out	on	the	appropriate	indexing	engine	sites.	Any	other	operation	in	order	to	find	information	on	the	web	also	appears	extremely	problematic	for	the	user	who	is	not	already	aware	of	the	sources	in	which	they	can	be	found,	and	also	for	this	alternative	modus	operandi	are	largely	obsolete	 in	 the	 habits	 of	 using	 web	 resources.	 by	 the	 average	 user,	 due	 to	 the	 absolutely	predominant	role	assumed	by	the	search	engines.	The	Google	Spain	 judgment	represented	a	 turning	point	 in	 the	protection	of	 the	right	 to	have	 online	 privacy,	 not	 so	 much	 because	 it	 affirmed	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 right	 to	 be	forgotten	also	with	reference	to	the	news	published	on	the	web,	but	rather	for	having	affirmed	the	 existence	 of	 specific	 obligations	 in	 headed	 by	 search	 engine	 managers,	 until	 then	substantially	unrelated	to	the	application	of	the	privacy	regulation.	This	substantial	immunity	with	 respect	 to	 the	 rules	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 personal	 data	 by	 the	 search	 engines	 was	moreover	favored	by	the	criteria	of	applicability	of	the	European	legislation	which	rested	on	the	 principle	 of	 establishment,	 by	 virtue	 of	 which	 the	 entities	 and	 companies	 based	 in	 the	abroad	 could	 only	 be	 subject	 to	 European	 regulations	 if	 they	 had	 a	 technical-legal	establishment	in	the	territory	of	the	European	Union.	This	circumstance,	also	in	the	wake	of	the	restrictive	notion	of	establishment	provided	by	the	jurisprudence	of	the	Court	of	Justice,	de	 facto	 determined	 the	 removal	 of	 these	 subjects	 from	 European	 legislation,	 with	 the	consequence	that	only	other	national	disciplines	were	objectionable	against	them,	such	as	the	US	 in	 case	 of	 Google,	 which	 however	 appeared	 to	 contain	 much	 less	 stringent	 obligations.	From	this	point	of	view,	in	any	case,	Regulation	679/16,	which	became	fully	operational	from	May	2018,	made	a	radical	change,	sanctioning	the	overcoming	of	the	establishment	principle	envisaged	by	the	previous	directive	and	adopting	the	different	criterion	of	the	nationality	of	the	user	or	the	place	where	he	is	at	the	time	the	treatment	is	carried	out.	One	 of	 the	 key	 points	 of	 the	 Google	 Spain	 judgment	 is	 the	 qualification	 of	 the	 search	engine	activity	as	a	personal	data	processing	activity.	This	statement	constitutes	an	important	landing	 place	 that	 has	 radically	 changed	 the	way	we	 understand	 the	 search	 engine	 activity	from	a	technical-legal	point	of	view.	Until	then	in	fact	doubts	prevailed	about	the	traceability	of	 this	 activity	 to	 the	 list	 of	 those	 involving	 the	 processing	 of	 personal	 data,	 especially	 in	consideration	of	the	almost	completely	automatic	nature	of	the	process	that	from	the	search	carried	out	through	the	search	engine	led	to	the	listing	of	the	results.		This	circumstance	mostly	 led	to	the	exclusion	of	 the	manager	of	 the	search	engine	 from	the	qualification	of	data	controller,	even	if	the	classification	and	listing	of	data	carried	out	by	the	engine	were	to	fall	within	the	scope	of	the	treatment	of	personal	data.		The	orientation	in	question	rested	essentially	on	the	consideration	of	the	absence	of	any	operation	for	determining	the	purposes	and	methods	of	data	processing	in	the	search	engine	activity,	the	operation	of	which	is	based	exclusively	on	an	algorithm	operating	automatically.	But	 there	 was	 also	 another	 aspect	 that	 led	 to	 exclude	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 privacy	legislation	 towards	 search	 engine	 managers,	 that	 is,	 that	 which	 referred	 to	 the	 non-
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configurability	 of	 data	 processing	 in	 the	 strict	 sense	 of	 the	 search	 engine	 manager,	 which	worked	by	merely	 listing	data	already	present	on	 the	web	 in	 the	source	sites	and	 therefore	only	the	latter	had	to	be	held	responsible	for	the	processing	of	the	data.			The	 innovative	 scope	of	 the	principle	 established	by	 the	Google	 Spain	 judgment	 is	 even	more	 appreciated	 if	 we	 consider	 that	 it	 contradicted	 even	 the	 conclusions	 that	 had	 been	formulated	 by	 the	 Advocate	 General	 of	 the	 Court,	 which	 had	 supported	 the	 traditional	conception	 that	 the	operations	carried	out	by	 the	 search	engine	were	completely	automatic	and	that	therefore	no	responsibility	for	the	processing	of	personal	data	could	be	ascribed	to	the	managers	of	 the	same.	The	approach	 followed	by	 the	Advocate	General,	which	reflected	the	prevailing	vision	at	the	time	in	terms	of	responsibility	for	online	data	processing,	focused	entirely	on	identifying	the	publishers	of	the	sites	of	the	only	subjects	called	to	respond	to	the	publication	 of	 news	 or	 information	 on	 the	 web	 and	 this	 belief	 was	 strengthened	 by	 the	consideration	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 the	 publishers	 themselves	 had	 the	 technical	 tools	necessary	 to	 avoid	 the	 further	diffusion	or	 the	 availability	 of	 the	news	 through	 indexing	by	search	engines,	making	use	of	file	robots.txt	through	which	indexing	itself	can	be	prevented.		The	Google	Spain	ruling	instead	marked	a	complete	change	of	perspective,	introducing	the	right	to	obtain	the	de-indexing	of	the	news	by	the	interested	party	even	in	the	absence	of	the	conditions	for	obtaining	the	cancellation	of	the	same	news.	In	fact,	the	novelty	sanctioned	by	the	Google	Spain	 judgment	does	not	 consist	 in	having	 introduced	a	 replacement	 remedy	 for	the	 traditional	 right	 to	 erasure	 already	 provided	 for	 by	 Directive	 n.	 95/46,	 as	 in	 having	established	 a	 further	 protection	 tool	 that	 can	 be	 experienced	 in	 situations	 that	 are	 partly	different	 from	those	 in	which	 the	 legitimate	exercise	of	 the	 right	 to	erasure	 is	possible.	The	essential	 core	 of	 the	 Google	 Spain	 judgment	 rests	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 right	 to	erasure	 in	 the	 strict	 sense	 and	 the	 newly	 affirmed	 right	 to	 deindexing.	 Although	 in	 fact	 the	right	to	de-indexing	can	be	considered	as	a	form	of	deletion	of	data,	it	is	equally	evident	that	it	is	not	completely	identifiable	with	the	right	to	erasure	properly	understood.		In	fact,	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	erasure	has	the	typical	effect	of	completely	deleting	the	data	that	is	subject	to	it,	with	consequent	no	further	traceability	of	the	same;	the	right	to	de-indexing,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 entails	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 data	 from	 the	 list	 returned	following	 searches	 carried	 out	 starting	 from	 the	 name	 of	 a	 natural	 person,	 but	 does	 not	necessarily	imply	the	elimination	of	the	information	from	the	sources	of	the	same,	or	from	the	sites	where	they	have	been	published.		The	 de-indexed	 information	 is	 therefore	 still	 traceable	 and	 accessible,	 although	 its	availability	is	made	more	difficult	due	to	their	elimination	from	the	list	of	results	returned	by	the	search	engine.	This	is	why	the	right	to	be	forgotten	online,	or	more	simply	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	given	that	the	essential	core	of	this	right	is	now	inevitably	referred	to	the	context	of	the	Internet	and	the	web,	has	been	rightly	defined	as	the	right	to	a	less	visibility,	rather	than	as	 the	 right	 to	 complete	 forgetfulness	 on	 the	 net.	 However,	 this	 feature	 should	 not	 be	interpreted	as	the	sign	of	lesser	protection,	but	as	the	outcome	of	the	necessary	compromise	between	the	need	for	protection	extension	and	the	intrinsic	peculiarities	of	the	network	and	the	 technologies	 connected	 to	 it.	 The	 only	 right	 to	 erasure,	 with	 its	 well-determined	conditions,	was	in	fact	unsuitable	to	constitute	the	protection	model	that	can	be	activated	in	all	 those	 cases	 in	which,	 even	 if	 the	 conditions	 for	obtaining	 the	 cancellation	are	not	met,	 a	very	precise	interest	for	the	subject	could	still	be	identified,	which	the	information	referred	to	not	 seeing	 their	 own	 person	 further	 exposed	 to	 the	 public	 for	 events	 that	 no	 longer	 had	 a	connection	with	the	present	situation.	This	consideration	arises	from	the	acknowledgment	that	certainly	the	permanence	of	the	information	on	 the	net	determines	a	significantly	greater	exposure	of	 the	person	concerned	
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compared	 to	what	 occurs	with	 reference	 to	 the	means	 of	 traditional	 printing,	 due	 to	 the	 a	priori	uncertainty	of	the	number	of	people	who	can	have	access	to	the	information	published	on	the	web	and	the	connected	impossibility	of	controlling	its	circulation,	even	only	partially.	The	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 therefore	 aims	 to	 mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 circulation	 of	information	through	the	web,	although	it	possesses	an	intrinsically	 lower	protective	efficacy	than	 the	 right	 to	 tout	 court	 cancellation	 of	 information	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 legitimately	disseminated.	This	 clear	difference	between	 the	 two	 institutions	of	 cancellation	and	de-indexing	must	not	however	 lead	 to	 fall	 into	 the	misunderstanding	of	believing	 that	cancellation,	unlike	de-indexing,	can	fully	guarantee	the	right	to	be	forgotten	on	the	net,	as	the	very	nature	of	the	web	and	tools	and	services	available	to	users	today,	they	do	not	allow	to	obtain	the	certainty	of	the	complete	elimination	of	data	from	circulation,	not	even	through	deletion	from	the	source	sites.	The	ability	to	obtain	private	copies	of	the	web	pages	hosting	the	news	subject	to	subsequent	cancellation,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 extract	 screenshots	 (Zaccone,	 2015,	 pp.	 218-219),	 are	 evidently	elements	 that	 also	 remove	 the	 ability	 to	 ensure	 complete	 and	 effective	 disappearance	 of	information	from	circulation	from	source	sites.		In	any	case,	the	affirmation	of	the	right	to	de-indexing	has	however	marked	an	advance	in	the	 process	 of	 extending	 the	 protection	 of	 privacy	 to	 the	 world	 of	 the	 web,	 which	 is	substantiated	in	the	introduction	of	a	new	right	distinct	from	that	of	cancellation.	The	right	to	data	 de-indexing,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 ruling	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 is	 based	 on	 assumptions	different	from	those	that	legitimize	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	erasure,	in	that	they	come	to	be	identified	not	with	the	illegitimacy	of	the	treatment	on	the	basis	of	the	criteria	established	by	the	 European	 and	 national	 legislation	 in	 force	 on	 the	 subject,	 but	 due	 to	 the	 simple	 more	relationship	to	the	present	than	published	news.	In	this	sense,	on	the	contrary,	it	can	certainly	be	 underlined	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 protection	 offered	 by	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	 is	 wider	 as	regards	the	applicability	hypotheses,	with	respect	to	the	right	to	cancellation,	where	the	lower	incisiveness	of	the	former	relates	to	the	forms	of	protection	provided.	The	right	to	de-indexing	can	therefore	be	exercised	whenever	the	published	information	is	no	longer	connected	to	the	present	as	it	is	no	longer	representative	of	the	current	identity	of	the	person	concerned.		This	 situation	 is	 likely	 to	occur	 in	 a	 series	of	different	hypotheses	 that	may	 include	 the	occurrence	of	 further	developments	in	the	matter	covered	by	the	publication	in	question,	or	the	change	in	conduct	of	the	person	concerned	with	respect	to	what	emerges	from	the	news	of	which	 it	 is	 requested	de-indexing.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	right	 to	de-indexing	behaves	differently	than	the	right	to	cancellation	tout	court,	as	it	does	not	necessarily	presuppose	an	injury	to	the	image	or	reputation	of	the	interested	party,	but	simply	the	non-compliance	of	the	information	published	with	what	is	the	current	identity	of	the	interested	party.	By	way	of	example,	 just	think	of	the	case	of	the	abandonment	by	the	interested	party	of	legitimate	personal	beliefs	previously	sustained	and	the	subject	of	information	published	via	the	web:	in	hypotheses	like	this	it	would	in	fact	be	difficult	to	think	of	protection	through	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	cancellation	from	the	source	sites,	not	in	itself	affecting	the	reputation	in	the	mere	fact	of	publication,	while	the	right	to	de-indexing	would	certainly	be	exercisable.	In	 fact,	 the	relationship	between	the	right	 to	report	and	the	right	 to	de-indexing	 is	different	from	that	which	exists	with	the	right	to	cancellation	from	the	source	sites.		While	 in	 fact	 the	 right	 to	 delete	 from	 the	 source	 sites	 is	 a	 limit	 to	 the	 right	 to	 report,	where	the	conditions	that	characterize	the	legitimate	exercise	of	the	latter	are	not	respected	and	 which	 have	 been	 identified	 by	 internal	 jurisprudence	 in	 the	 criteria	 forming	 the	decalogue	referred	to	in	the	judgment	of	the	Cassation	n.	from	1985,	the	right	to	de-indexing	is	 released	 from	 these	 criteria,	 being	 operable	 whenever	 the	 news,	 even	 if	 legitimately	
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published,	does	not	reflect	the	current	image	of	the	interested	party.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	this	fundamental	distinction	constitutes	one	of	the	main	provisions	that	Google	Spain	itself	has	formulated,	according	to	which	the	right	to	de-indexing	exists	even	in	cases	where	the	right	to	erasure	cannot	be	exercised,	with	respect	to	which	it	therefore	has	perfect	autonomy,	having	regard	 only	 to	 the	 topicality	 of	 the	 news	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 its	dissemination.	In	this	sense,	the	right	to	de-indexing	acts	as	a	means	of	protecting	the	correct	representation	 of	 the	 current	 identity	 of	 the	 interested	 party,	 who	 encounters	 the	 only	limitation	 in	 maintaining	 a	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 further	 dissemination	 of	 the	 news.	 Any	information	that	no	longer	has	a	link	with	the	present,	in	the	sense	described	in	the	foregoing,	is	therefore	likely	to	be	de-indexed	by	the	results	of	the	search	engine	obtained	starting	from	the	 insertion	of	 the	name	of	 the	 interested	party,	 except	 in	 the	 case	 in	which	 the	particular	public	 relevance	 of	 the	 news	 justifies	 its	 full	 availability	 through	 the	 resources	 of	 the	information	indexing	sites.	The	concept	of	public	interest	in	the	continuing	publication	of	the	news	 as	 a	 limit	 to	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	 is	 obviously	 such	 as	 not	 to	 offer	 objective	parameters	 valid	 for	 each	 individual	 case,	 but	 constitutes	 an	 element	 whose	 existence	 can	only	 be	 ascertained	 from	 time	 to	 time	 by	 the	 judge	 called	 to	 rule	 on	 the	 request	 for	 de-indexing	information.		However,	 some	 criteria	 to	 refer	 the	 judgment	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 request	 for	 de-indexing	have	been	indicated	by	the	same	Court	of	Justice	in	the	same	Google	Spain	judgment,	where	the	Luxembourg	judges	have	addressed	the	aspect	of	the	public	character	of	the	person	to	whom	 the	 news	 object	 of	 the	 request	 for	 de-indexing	 refers.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Court	 of	Justice,	 taking	 up	 an	 orientation	 already	 expressed	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 right	 to	 erasure,	reiterated	that	for	people	with	a	public	role	or	notoriety	within	a	given	community,	a	different	and	more	rigorous	assessment	is	required	regarding	the	existence	of	a	general	interest	in	the	persistence	of	the	publication	of	the	news.	The	very	fact	that	the	news	concerns	people	known	to	the	public	in	fact	determines	a	weakening	of	the	right	to	de-indexing,	as	the	sphere	of	life	reserved	 and	 removed	 from	 the	 public's	 knowledge	 of	 these	 people	 is	 certainly	 more	restricted	than	that	to	which	any	private	citizen	can	legitimately	aspire,	without	notoriety	or	public	 responsibility.	 This	 disparity	 of	 conditions,	 although	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 acceptable	 in	principle,	 is	 a	 source	 of	 application	 problems	 of	 not	 simple	 solution,	 given	 that	 no	 precise	indication	is	given	by	the	jurisprudence	on	the	effective	scope	of	extension	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	 and	 more	 generally	 of	 the	 right	 to	 privacy	 attributable	 to	 famous	 persons.	 The	commonly	 accepted	 orientation	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 inclined	 to	 recognize	 the	 existence	 of	 the	right	to	be	forgotten	only	with	regard	to	events	strictly	related	to	the	sphere	of	the	intimate	life	of	the	characters	concerned.	However,	such	a	way	of	reasoning	risks	exposing	the	private	life	of	people	known	to	the	public	to	prejudices	far	greater	than	those	generally	justifiable	due	to	 the	condition	of	notoriety	covered	and	 this	especially	 in	consideration	of	 the	progressive	erosion	of	the	border	between	the	public	and	private	spheres	induced	by	a	misunderstanding	right	 to	 information	 that	 ends	 up	 favoring	 the	 indiscriminate	 enlargement	 of	 the	 public	dimension	to	the	detriment	of	the	private	one.	This	phenomenon	has	certainly	been	favored	and	 increased	 by	 the	 advent	 and	 spread	 of	 internet-related	 technologies	 which	 with	 their	pervasiveness	 have	 undoubtedly	 changed	 the	 very	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	 concepts	 of	privacy	 and	 information	 advertising,	 offering	moreover	 the	 possibility	 to	 any	 user	 to	 be	 an	active	 part	 in	 creating	 and	 sharing	 a	 dimension	 in	which	 practically	 everything	 is	 likely	 to	become	public.		This	 trend	 has	 also	 affected	 the	 well-known	 personalities,	 inevitably	 involved	 in	 new	ways	of	 relating	with	 the	private	 generated	by	 the	 so-called	 "sharing	 culture"	 typical	 of	 the	world	of	 the	web.	The	 influence	of	 this	cultural	attitude	 inevitably	risks	also	 influencing	 the	
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judgment	 of	 the	 judicial	 authorities,	 which	 are	 caught	 between	 the	 absence	 of	 legally	established	 objective	 parameters	 and	 the	 substantial	 weakening	 of	 the	 common	 sense	 of	confidentiality	and	discretion.	This	common	risk	presents	itself	in	an	aggravated	form	for	the	characters	that	play	a	public	role,	precisely	as	a	result	of	the	lesser	guarantees	that	in	terms	of	the	protection	of	the	right	to	privacy	are	recognized	by	the	national	and	supranational	order.	But	 precisely	 this	 element	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 current	 cultural	 and	 technological	 context	risks	 leading	to	a	serious	contrast	between	the	protection	that	can	actually	be	achieved	and	the	system	of	 fundamental	human	rights	as	 it	was	developed	starting	 from	the	second	post-war	 period.	 Therefore,	 not	 only	 do	 problems	 arise	 regarding	 respect	 for	 the	 principle	 of	equality	also	with	reference	to	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	but	it	is	the	system	of	rights	as	well	as	structured	that	risks	being	put	in	serious	crisis.	As	regards	instead	the	right	to	be	forgotten	of	ordinary	people,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	limit	of	the	public	interest,	in	the	prevailing	interpretation,	is	put	in	close	correlation	with	the	elapsed	time	with	respect	to	the	facts	that	are	the	subject	of	the	information	of	which	we	ask	de-indexing.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 topicality	 of	 the	 news	 must	 be	 assessed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	public	 interest	 and	 the	 latter	 relates	 closely	 to	 the	 time	 elapsed	 since	 the	 event.	 The	chronological	 factor,	 however,	 does	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 excluding	 the	 persistence	 of	 a	public	 interest	 in	 the	persistent	publication	or	new	diffusion	of	 the	news,	especially	when	 it	comes	to	information	related	to	facts	of	certain	public	 importance,	such	as	those	concerning	the	commission	of	particularly	heinous	murders.	In	this	sense,	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	has	expressly	ruled	on	a	request	for	de-indexing	made	by	two	German	brothers,	guilty	of	a	serious	murder	committed	more	than	twenty	years	earlier,	in	relation	to	the	news	of	their	conviction	for	that	fact.	Rejecting	the	appeal	lodged	by	the	two	brothers,	the	Strasbourg	Court	held	that	even	if	a	long	time	had	passed	since	the	moment	of	the	fact,	the	request	of	the	two	brothers	it	was	not	legitimate,	as	there	was	still	a	sure	interest	of	the	public	opinion	to	know	what	 had	 happened,	 since	 it	 was	 a	 crime	 of	 particular	 seriousness	whose	 social	 value	was	considered	 prevalent	 also	with	 respect	 to	 the	 circumstance	 of	 the	 fulfillment	 by	 of	 the	 two	guilty	of	a	path	of	repentance	and	personal	rehabilitation.	The	 affirmation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 online,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 de-indexing	 of	information	that	is	no	longer	current	or	of	public	interest	from	the	search	engine	results,	has	certainly	 contributed	 to	 filling	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 European	 legal	 system,	 introducing	 a	 further	protection	tool	in	a	area	in	which	the	typical	restrictions	of	the	right	to	cancellation	from	the	source	 sites	 determined	 the	 concrete	 difficulty	 of	 guaranteeing	 an	 effective	 space	 for	 the	defense	 of	 rights.	 Despite	 having	 produced	 the	 appreciable	 result	 of	 having	 increased	 the	possibility	 of	 protection	 in	 an	 area	 in	 which	 the	 lack	 of	 defense	 was	 strongly	 felt	 with	reference	 above	 all	 to	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 of	 the	 person,	 the	 system	 derived	 from	 the	
Google	Spain	judgment	is	not	free	from	gaps	and	critical	issues.	In	 the	 first	 place,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	newly	 affirmed	 right	 to	 de-indexing	has	 a	strictly	 subjective	 and	 personal	 value,	 as	 the	 mechanism	 envisaged	 for	 its	 exercise	 only	contemplates	 the	 possibility	 of	 obtaining	 the	 cancellation	 from	 the	 search	 engine	 results	 of	links	 to	 outdated	 news	 that	 concern	 the	 applicant	 and	 are	 obtained	 exclusively	 from	 the	insertion	 of	 the	 name	 of	 the	 latter	 in	 the	 terms	 to	 be	 searched.	 This	 state	 of	 affairs	 leaves	completely	 out	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 intervention	 the	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 news	 whose	connection	is	requested	to	be	removed	involves	other	subjects	besides	the	applicant.	(Bianchi,	D’Acquisto,	2015,	pp.	81	ss)	In	such	cases,	in	fact,	even	if	the	request	for	de-indexing	by	one	of	the	 interested	 parties	 were	 to	 be	 satisfied,	 the	 possibility	 of	 finding	 links	 to	 news	 would	remain	unaffected	by	inserting	the	name	or	names	of	the	other	interested	parties	in	the	search	engine.	Similarly,	the	protection	offered	by	the	right	to	de-indexing	does	not	cover	the	cases	in	
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which	 searches	 are	 carried	 out	 using	 other	 terms	 other	 than	 the	 names	 of	 the	 subjects	concerned,	 since,	 as	 is	 known,	 the	 retrieval	 of	 news	 through	 the	 search	 engines	 is	 possible	starting	 from	 all	 the	 terms	 that	 have	 a	 correlation	 with	 the	 object	 of	 the	 same.	 This	 is	obviously	 a	 shortcoming	 which	 in	 some	 cases	 can	 lead	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 protection	instrument	 prepared	 through	de-indexing,	 so	 it	would	 certainly	 be	 appropriate	 to	 resort	 to	the	 introduction	 of	 corrections	 to	 the	 system,	 or	 to	 provide	 for	 the	 regulation	 and	implementation	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 protection	 that	 share	 with	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	 the	objective	 of	 protecting	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 interested	 party,	 as	 it	 is	 currently	 perceived	 and	manifested	by	 the	 same.	 From	 this	point	 of	 view,	 a	 certain	 value	 can	undoubtedly	have	 the	right	to	correct	information,	if	it	is	no	longer	up	to	date	with	the	developments	that	the	story	initially	reported	after	the	publication	of	the	news.	In	this	regard,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	Italian	 system	 was	 among	 the	 first	 to	 affirm	 this	 right	 to	 correction,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	imposition	 on	 publishers	 of	 online	 newspapers	 of	 the	 precise	 obligation	 to	 provide	 for	 the	correction	and	updating	of	the	news	in	the	presence	of	subsequent	developments	in	favor	of	the	interested	party.	The	 right	 in	question	has	not	been	 regulated	by	 the	 legislator,	but	has	been	 introduced	interpretatively	by	the	jurisprudence	starting	from	judgment	n.	5525	of	2012	of	the	Court	of	Cassation.	Following	the	ruling	on	the	Google	Spain	case,	the	adoption	of	European	Union	Regulation	n.	n.679	/	2016,	represented	a	clear	novelty	in	the	field	of	the	regulation	of	the	processing	of	personal	data	in	Europe,	introducing	some	changes	also	in	the	matter	of	the	right	to	erasure	and	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	However,	the	Regulation	in	question,	while	intervening	at	a	time	when	the	figure	of	 the	right	to	be	 forgotten	online	 in	the	form	of	 the	right	to	de-indexing	as	outlined	 by	 the	Google	 Spain	 judgment	must	 be	 considered	 acquired	 by	 the	 European	 legal	heritage,	no	specific	regulation	of	right	to	privacy	on	the	web,	enclosing	in	a	single	provision	the	discipline	of	 the	 right	 to	 cancellation	 in	general	 (art.17).	This	 rule	 is	 already	 interesting	starting	 from	 the	heading	 that	 entitles	 it,	where	 reference	 is	made	 to	 the	 "right	 to	 erasure"	with	 the	 indication	 in	 brackets	 of	 the	 phrase	 "right	 to	 be	 forgotten".	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	necessary	to	reiterate	that	the	right	to	erasure	and	the	right	to	be	forgotten	even	if	they	have	many	common	 features,	do	not	 coincide	completely,	 especially	 in	 light	of	 the	differentiation	posed	by	the	Google	Spain	 judgment	between	the	right	to	erasure	in	the	strict	sense	and	the	right	to	de-indexing	precisely.	The	right	to	erasure	is	indeed	the	most	typical	form	of	exercise	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	as	it	involves	the	elimination	of	data	attributable	to	the	sphere	of	confidentiality,	thereby	adhering	properly	to	the	idea	of	forgetfulness	underlying	the	concept	itself	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 right	 oblivion.	 However,	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	 change	 in	relation	 to	 the	 context	 of	 the	 web	 and	 related	 technologies	 and	 the	 internet,	 where	 the	complete	 disappearance	 of	 the	 contents	 and	 information	 cannot	 be	 guaranteed	 in	 a	 certain	way,	 not	 even	 through	 the	 deletion	 of	 data	 from	 the	 source:	 for	 this	 reason	 the	 right	 to	 be	forgotten	on	the	net	is	rather	configured	as	the	right	to	limit	the	circulation	of	the	data	of	the	interested	 party	 and	 as	 the	 right	 to	 the	 lesser	 availability	 of	 the	 same	 that	 are	 no	 longer	current.	The	scope	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	therefore	includes	that	of	cancellation,	but	does	not	end	 therein,	 also	 including	 the	 right	 to	de-indexing	as	well	 as	other	 forms	of	protection	such	as	 those	represented	by	the	right	 to	rectification	of	 information	and	that	of	preventing	the	republishing	of	news.	(Siano,	Tempestini,	2015)		The	choice	of	the	European	legislator	to	 identify	the	right	to	erasure	and	the	right	to	be	forgotten	 in	 a	 single	 provision	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 attention	 by	 commentators,	 some	of	whom	 have	 glimpsed	 the	 desire	 to	 overcome	 the	 regime	 deriving	 from	 the	 Google	 Spain	judgment;	 however	 it	 appears	 more	 realistically	 dictated	 by	 the	 aim	 of	 allowing	 a	 more	
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immediate	comprehensibility	of	the	content	of	the	provision,	rather	than	by	actual	abrogation	intentions	of	the	regime	on	the	right	to	de-indexing.	And	indeed	all	the	considerations	made	in	the	 sense	 of	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 system	 derived	 from	 the	 Google	 Spain	 judgment	 (Zanini,	2018)	 inevitably	 collide	with	 the	 fact	 represented	 by	 the	 reconditioning	 of	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	in	the	context	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	person	as	well	as	those	characterizing	the	European	legal	system	as	a	whole.		There	is	an	explicit	affirmation	in	Google	Spain	itself,	which	links	the	right	to	be	forgotten	to	the	system	of	rights	enshrined	in	the	European	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights,	in	particular	those	referred	to	in	art.	7	and	8,	considered	part	of	the	common	legal	heritages	at	European	level.	For	 this	 reason,	 the	new	regulations	 laid	down	by	 the	recently	 introduced	Regulation,	should	 rather	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 integrative	 and	 not	 a	 substitute	 source	 for	 the	 law	 sanctioned	starting	 from	the	Google	Spain	 judgment.	The	Article	17	of	Regulation	n.	679/2016,	without	distinguishing	 between	 the	 recipients	 of	 the	 standard,	 that	 is,	 between	 data	 controllers	operating	online	and	not,	provides	for	the	possibility	of	requesting	and	obtaining	the	deletion	of	data	in	cases	where:		 a)	 personal	 data	 are	 no	 longer	 necessary	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 purposes	 for	which	they	were	collected	or	otherwise	processed;	b)	the	interested	party	revokes	the	consent	on	which	the	treatment	is	based	in	accordance	with	article	6,	paragraph	1,	letter	a),	or	with	article	9,	paragraph	2,	letter	a),	and	if	there	is	no	other	legal	basis	for	the	treatment;	c)	 the	 interested	 party	 opposes	 the	 treatment	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 21,	paragraph	1,	and	there	is	no	prevailing	legitimate	reason	to	proceed	with	the	treatment,	or	opposes	the	treatment	pursuant	to	Article	21,	paragraph	2;	d)	personal	data	have	been	unlawfully	processed;	e)	 personal	 data	must	 be	 deleted	 to	 fulfill	 a	 legal	 obligation	 under	Union	 or	Member	State	law	to	which	the	data	controller	is	subject;	f)	 personal	 data	 have	 been	 collected	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 offer	 of	 information	society	services	referred	to	in	Article	8	(1).		All	 these	 hypotheses	 in	 which	 the	 possibility	 of	 exercising	 the	 right	 to	 erasure	 is	envisaged	refer	to	situations	in	which	the	processing	of	data	was	carried	out	in	the	absence	of	the	 legitimate	 assumptions	 from	 the	 beginning,	 or	 to	 cases	 in	 which	 they	 ceased	 to	 exist	during	the	course	of	the	time	the	conditions	that	originally	legitimized	the	treatment	itself.	In	the	 absence	 of	 any	 specific	 provision,	 it	 should	 be	 considered	 that	 this	 rule	 applies	 both	 to	data	controllers	operating	online	and	to	those	who	use	more	traditional	communication	tools.	The	rule	referred	to	in	art.	17	then	continues	with	a	further	paragraph	stating	that	“If	the	data	 controller	 has	 made	 personal	 data	 public	 and	 is	 obliged,	 pursuant	 to	 paragraph	 1,	 to	delete	 it,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 available	 technology	 and	 implementation	 costs,	 adopt	 the	measures	reasonable,	even	technical,	 to	 inform	the	data	controllers	that	they	are	processing	the	 personal	 data	 of	 the	 request	 of	 the	 interested	 party	 to	 delete	 any	 link,	 copy	 or	reproduction	of	his	personal	data”.	This	is	one	of	the	most	significant	provisions	of	the	Regulation	in	that	it	arises	in	a	certain	sense	 to	 complement	 the	 European	 system	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten,	regulating	 an	 aspect	 that	 is	 Directive	 n.	 95/46,	 which	 the	 Google	 Spain	 judgment	 had	neglected	 to	 consider.	 The	 importance	 of	 the	 rule	 derives	 from	 the	 evident	 purpose	 of	preparing	a	tool	that	is	legally	capable	of	limiting	as	much	as	possible	the	undue	circulation	of	data	destined	to	be	deleted.	This	aspect,	as	already	underlined	previously,	represents	one	of	the	 main	 problems	 related	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 online	 and	 to	 the	
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guarantee	of	its	effectiveness,	since	the	control	over	the	circulation	of	data	within	the	web	is	notoriously	difficult	 to	maintain,	 both	 for	 the	 specific	 characteristics	 of	 the	network	 and	 its	capillarity,	and	for	the	multiplication	of	contracts	for	the	transfer	of	the	collected	data	to	third	parties,	stipulated	by	the	data	controllers	operating	via	the	web.	The	rule,	however,	does	not	allow	 to	 understand	 sufficiently	 precisely	what	 the	 obligations	 actually	 fall	 on	 third	 parties	and	 specifically	 if	 it	 can	be	 considered	 the	existence	of	 an	automatic	 cancellation	obligation	following	the	request	to	remove	data	that	is	not	presented	as	unfounded.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	not	all	the	hypotheses	that	justify	the	cancellation	of	the	data,	referred	to	in	par.	1	of	art.	17	GDPR	appear	to	justify	an	obligation	automatically	transmissible	to	third	parties.	In	 particular,	 the	 hypothesis	 sub	 a),	 regarding	 the	 supervening	 lack	 of	 need	 for	 data	processing	with	respect	to	the	purposes	of	the	same,	does	not	necessarily	seem	to	apply	to	all	the	treatments	derived	from	the	original	one,	but	rather	inherent	to	the	individual	treatment	considered	and	to	the	specific	purposes	of	the	same.		The	existence	in	the	individual	case	of	the	condition	referred	to	in	letter	a)	will	therefore	be	 left	 to	 the	evaluation	of	 the	 individual	 third	party	owner	of	 the	 treatment	 independently	from	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 original	 treatment,	 who	 will	 only	 be	 required	 to	 communicate	 the	existence	 of	 a	 well-founded	 request	 for	 cancellation.	 Even	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	jurisdictional	protection,	 the	power	 to	order	 the	direct	deletion	by	 third	parties	of	 the	data	subject	 to	a	 request	 for	 removal	proposed	against	 the	owner	of	 the	original	 treatment	does	not	seem	to	be	able	to	be	configured	by	the	judge,	as	in	this	sense	the	art.	17	does	not	seem	to	testify.	What	will	be	possible	to	obtain	coercively	in	court	appears	only	to	be	the	fulfillment	of	the	 obligation	 to	 inform	 third	 parties	 of	 the	 cancellation	 request,	 without	 prejudice	 to	 the	possibility	for	the	interested	party	to	establish	autonomous	judgments	to	obtain	the	removal	of	 data	 by	 third	 parties	 of	 whose	 further	 processing	 than	 that	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 original	owner,	he	 is	aware	of	 it.	However,	where	there	 is	a	substantial	affinity	between	the	original	treatment	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 third	 parties,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	communication	 by	 the	 owner	 results	 in	 a	 corresponding	 obligation	 to	 proceed	 with	 the	cancellation	also	for	the	third	party	who	has	put	in	place	the	"derivative"	treatment.	Furthermore,	as	regards	the	reasons	for	excluding	the	right	to	erasure,	they	are	provided	for	 in	 c.	 3,	 art.	 17,	 which	 provides	 that	 the	 cancellation	 should	 not	 proceed	 when	 the	processing	is	necessary:		 a)	for	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	and	information;	b)	for	the	fulfillment	of	a	legal	obligation	that	requires	the	treatment	provided	for	by	Union	or	Member	State	law	to	which	the	data	controller	is	subject	or	for	the	execution	of	a	 task	carried	out	 in	 the	public	 interest	or	 in	 the	exercise	of	public	powers	of	which	the	data	controller	is	invested;		c)	for	reasons	of	public	interest	in	the	public	health	sector	in	accordance	with	Article	9	(2)	(h)	and	(i),	and	Article	9	(3);	d)	 for	 archiving	 purposes	 in	 the	 public	 interest,	 for	 scientific	 or	 historical	research	or	 for	statistical	purposes	 in	accordance	with	Article	89	(1),	 insofar	as	 the	 right	 referred	 to	 in	 paragraph	 1	 is	 likely	 to	 render	 impossible	 or	seriously	impair	the	achievement	of	its	objectives	treatment;	or	e)	for	the	assessment,	exercise	or	defense	of	a	right	in	court.		The	rule	concerns	a	series	of	heterogeneous	cases,	but	the	one	referred	to	 in	 letter	a)	 is	certainly	the	one	destined	to	have	the	greatest	attention	from	operators,	as	it	indicates	what	can	rightly	be	considered	as	the	main	counter-interest	in	law	to	be	forgotten,	that	is,	the	right	to	information	and	that	of	freedom	of	expression.	It	is	around	the	balance	between	these	two	
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fundamental	 rights	 that	 the	whole	 system	of	 the	protection	of	 the	 right	 to	be	 forgotten	and	more	generally	of	the	right	to	privacy	revolves.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	from	the	beginning	the	affirmation	of	the	right	to	privacy	has	had	as	its	point	of	comparison	the	publication	of	news	by	the	press.	Just	think	about	the	story	that	gave	rise	to	the	essay	The	Right	to	Privacy	by	Warren	and	Brandeis	(1890),	considered	as	the	first	work	in	which	the	right	to	privacy	was	theorized,	or	to	national	court	cases,	such	as	the	Esfandiari	case,	which	in	the	For	the	first	time,	the	Italian	legal	system	has	firmly	affirmed	the	recognition	 of	 an	 autonomous	 right	 to	 privacy	 and	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 opposite	 right	 to	report.	In	this	regard	it	is	good	to	specify	that	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	right	to	information	are	both	 fundamental	 rights	of	 the	person	and	 therefore	are	 subject	 to	balance,	however	 in	the	 concrete	 application	 of	 this	 balance,	 it	 certainly	 does	 not	 fail	 to	make	 its	 weight	 feel	 a	certain	ideal	orientation,	aimed	at	privileging	the	reasons	for	the	right	to	information	in	most	cases.	By	virtue	of	this	orientation,	that	is,	the	right	to	information	and	the	right	to	report	are	considered	to	be	less	expendable	rights	than	many	others,	including	the	right	to	privacy	and	therefore	also	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	This	principle	option	is	probably	linked	to	the	history	of	 western	 countries,	 where	 freedom	 of	 the	 press	 and	 freedom	 of	 expression	 have	 been	closely	 linked	 to	 political	 and	 civil	 liberties	 and	 their	 conquest.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	however,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 highlight,	 from	 a	 comparative	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 differences	between	 the	 European	 and	US	 systems.	 In	 the	 latter,	 in	 fact,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 right	 to	freedom	of	expression	and	freedom	of	the	press	is	even	greater	than	that	which	is	commonly	attributed	 to	 them	 in	 the	 European	 context,	 reaching	 an	 almost	 sacred	 and	 unconditional	character.	Although	 in	 the	US	 system	 there	have	 recently	been	 cases	 that	 seem	 to	 lead	 in	 a	partially	opposite	direction,	the	right	to	privacy	is	a	right	that	can	be	protected	only	where	the	sacrifice	of	freedom	of	the	press	is	justified	by	reasons	of	serious	and	exceptional	prejudice	to	the	person	of	the	'interested.	This	is	because,	in	the	US	legal	system,	the	press	takes	on	a	much	more	 accentuated	 role	 of	 political	 and	 democratic	 control	 than	 in	 other	 systems	 also	belonging	 to	 the	western	area.	 In	 the	European	 context	 instead,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 general	propensity	to	favor	the	reasons	of	the	right	of	news,	the	relations	between	this	and	the	right	to	privacy	appear	less	unbalanced,	perhaps	also	because	of	the	weight	that	from	the	historical	and	 cultural	 point	 of	 view	 have	 had	 in	 Europe	 the	 experiences	 of	 totalitarian	 regimes	 and	subsequent	 reactions	 in	 terms	of	 spreading	movements	 aimed	at	 defending	 the	dignity	 and	respect	of	the	person.	Even	with	this	basic	differentiation	also	in	Europe,	therefore,	the	problem	of	balancing	the	right	to	report	and	the	right	to	privacy	does	not	reflect	a	situation	of	perfect	equality	between	the	two	rights	on	an	abstract	level,	although	in	concrete	terms	the	relationship	between	them	is	 left	 to	 the	 interpretative	work	 carried	out	by	 the	 jurisprudence,	with	 results	 that	 are	not	always	uniform	and	foreseeable,	on	the	basis	of	a	phenomenon	that	is	only	partially	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	peculiarities	of	a	system	not	based	on	the	previous	judicial	precedent,	such	as	the	Italian	one.		
The	 balance	 between	 fundamental	 rights	 in	 the	 case	 law	 following	
the	Google	Spain	judgment		 Also	following	the	entry	into	force	of	EU	Regulation	n.	679/2016,	doubts	remain	about	the	effective	 scope	 of	 the	 right	 to	 erasure	 and	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 online,	 especially	 as	regards	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 right	 to	 report	 and	 the	 right	 to	 information.	 No	 express	indication	is	contained	in	this	regard	in	the	aforementioned	Regulation,	as	well	as	in	national	
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and	supranational	 laws.	n	general,	 it	 can	be	 said	 that	 the	 requirements	of	 the	 right	of	news	prevail	insofar	as	it	is	a	correct	exercise	of	this	right,	whereas	instead	it	must	necessarily	leave	room	for	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	right	to	be	forgotten	when	the	news	is	no	longer	relevant	and	of	public	interest.	As	for	the	correct	exercise	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	we	can	only	refer	to	 the	 criteria	 established	 by	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 S.C.	 (Cass.,	 sent.,	 18	 ottobre	 1984	 n.	5259)	 as	 regards	 the	 conditions	 that	 in	 our	 system	 legitimize	 the	 publication	 of	 data	 and	information	regarding	third	parties.	The	three	fundamental	criteria	identified	by	the	Court	of	Cassation	 are	 those	 of	 the	 truth	 and	 public	 interest	 of	 the	 news	 and	 that	 of	 expressive	continence	 by	 the	 author	 of	 the	 news.	 However,	 these	 criteria	 are	 only	 partially	superimposable	 to	 those	 that	 justify	 the	 permanence	 of	 a	 news	 or	 personal	 data	 on	 the	network,	given	that	 the	right	 to	de-indexing	may	also	be	partially	 independent	of	 the	public	interest,	being	able	to	be	exercised	whenever	the	news	no	longer	covers	the	topical	nature	in	the	representation	of	the	identity	of	the	interested	party,	even	if	there	may	be	a	certain	public	relevance	of	the	fact	covered	by	the	news.		However,	the	release	from	the	public	interest	of	the	right	to	de-indexing	is	not	complete,	as	the	former	will	return	to	assume	a	decisive	function	in	the	context	of	balancing,	when	it	has	a	 character	 of	 particular	 relevance,	 which	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 qualified	 relevance.	 In	 this	sense,	the	European	supranational	jurisprudence,	already	referred	to,	has	established	that	the	right	to	de-indexing	cannot	be	applied	where	it	concerns	news	that,	even	if	referring	to	events	that	occurred	a	long	time	before,	concern	events	of	particular	importance	for	public	opinion,	such	as	that	relating	to	a	murder	case	committed	by	two	brothers	of	German	nationality.	Furthermore,	 as	 regards	 the	 right	 to	 cancellation	 from	 the	 source	 sites,	 which	 still	represents	the	fullest	 form	of	 implementation	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	the	conditions	for	its	 achievement	 are	 certainly	 more	 stringent	 than	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	 and	 can	 be	identified	with	the	conditions	that	determine	the	criminal	illegality	of	the	publication.	n	fact,	the	deletion	of	data	from	online	sites,	as	outlined	since	the	Google	Spain	judgment,	does	not	correspond	to	the	deletion	that	can	be	obtained	in	relation	to	news	and	data	published	in	the	traditional	 press	media,	 in	 which	 a	much	more	 decisive	 role	 plays	 the	 interest	 public	 as	 a	discriminating	element	 for	 the	purpose	of	 the	 concrete	 recognition	of	 the	 law	 in	object.	For	this	reason	it	can	be	considered	that	the	conditions	that	 legitimize	the	cancellation	from	the	source	 sites	 substantially	 coincide	 with	 the	 hypotheses	 that	 based	 on	 the	 common	experiences	of	the	national	legal	systems,	determine	the	criminal	illegality	of	the	publication,	that	is	when	an	unjust	injury	of	honor	and	of	the	reputation	of	the	interested	party.	This	difference	actually	poses	compatibility	problems	with	the	principle	of	equality	as	 it	ends	up	attributing	an	unfavorable	position	 to	 the	 interested	party	who	wants	 to	assert	 the	right	 to	 cancellation	 from	websites	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 the	 person	who	 asks	 to	 obtain	 the	restoration	of	a	situation	of	legality	in	relation	to	news	published	in	traditional	media.	In	the	case	 of	 the	 latter,	 in	 fact,	 any	 compensatory	 or	 satisfactory	 action	 aimed	 at	 obtaining	 the	elimination	 of	 the	 prejudicial	 consequences	 deriving	 from	 the	 disputed	 publication	 will	 be	legitimate,	when	any	of	the	requirements	that	make	the	publication	legitimate	and	therefore	also	that	referring	to	a	public	 interest	are	missing,	ordinarily	and	generically	understood;	 in	the	 case	 of	 the	 interested	 party	 who	 wants	 to	 protect	 themselves	 against	 news	 published	online,	however,	 the	most	easily	 remedied	remedy	will	be	 the	de-indexing	of	 the	content	 in	question,	 while	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 cancellation	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 demonstrate	 the	absence	of	even	a	generic	public	interest	to	the	persisting	publication	of	the	news,	unless	the	presentation	of	 the	 facts	does	not	 in	 itself	 result	 in	 an	unjustified	damage	 to	 the	honor	and	reputation	of	the	person	concerned.		
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This	divergent	situation	derives	directly	from	the	system	resulting	from	the	Google	Spain	judgment,	which	indirectly	sanctioned	a	different	calibration	of	the	concept	of	public	interest	in	relation	to	the	news	of	the	online	press	and	those	of	the	traditional	press.	However,	it	will	be	 necessary	 to	 wait	 for	 further	 developments	 of	 European	 jurisprudence	 on	 this	 point	 to	understand	 whether	 this	 orientation,	 which	 generates	 a	 situation	 of	 disparity	 and	contradiction	within	 the	 European	 legal	 system,	will	 be	 confirmed	 and	 consolidated	within	the	same.		A	different	profile	taken	into	consideration	by	recent	European	 jurisprudence	 is	 instead	that	 concerning	 the	 geographic	 extension	 of	 the	 right	 to	 de-indexing	with	 reference	 to	 the	different	 domain	 names	 that	 the	 search	 engine	 assumes	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 countries	 of	connection	of	the	users.	In	this	regard,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(Sent.	n.	136	del	 24/09/2019),	 referring	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 the	 right	 of	 the	Union	 to	explain	effects	beyond	its	territorial	boundaries,	has	stated	that	the	obligation	of	de-indexing	only	applies	to	versions	of	the	search	with	the	domain	names	of	the	countries	belonging	to	the	European	 Union.	 This	 ruling,	 the	 subject	 of	 almost	 unanimous	 critical	 comments	 from	scholars,	ended	up	establishing	a	principle	capable	of	contradicting	the	very	rationale	of	the	system	established	by	 the	Google	Spain	 judgment	and	substantially	nullifying	 the	protection	introduced.	The	 territorial	 limitation	on	 the	operation	of	 the	 right	 to	de-indexing,	 in	 fact,	 in	addition	 to	 significantly	 reducing	 in	 itself	 the	protection	obtainable	 through	 the	 right	 to	de-indexing,	 seems	 to	be	 the	 result	of	 a	 failure	 to	 consider	 the	actual	nature	of	 reality	without	territorial	boundaries	 that	 the	network	has,	 in	one	to	 the	activities	 that	 take	place	within	 it.	The	 presence	 of	 different	 domain	 names	 for	 search	 engines	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 a	 national	exclusivity	 in	 accessing	 the	 site,	 based	 on	 the	 country	 of	 connection	 of	 the	 user,	 but	 only	responds	 to	 commercial	 and	 advertising	 needs,	 aimed	 at	 the	 offer	 of	 services	 and	announcements	 as	 targeted	 and	 calibrated	 as	 possible	 on	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 connected	user.	 The	 presence	 of	 domain	 names	 referring	 to	 individual	 countries	 does	 not	 therefore	preclude	the	possibility	for	users	of	a	specific	country	to	access	versions	of	the	search	engine	site	with	domain	names	 from	other	countries.	 	Furthermore,	 the	existence	of	circumvention	systems	for	the	detection	of	the	connection	nation,	such	as	VPNs,	allows	access	to	sites	with	a	foreign	domain	name	even	in	those	countries	where	such	access	is	officially	prohibited	due	to	political	choices,	or	 technically	prevented	by	redirection	activity	often	carried	out	by	search	engines.		In	 the	 same	way,	 as	 admitted	by	 the	 same	company	Google	 in	 the	 case	 in	question,	 the	treatment	carried	out	by	the	search	engine	is	independent	of	the	nationality	of	the	subject	to	which	 the	 data	 refer,	 as	 any	 data	 that	 is	 acquired	 by	 the	 search	 engine	 becomes	 part	 of	 a	globally	unique	database	and	undergoes	substantially	unitary	treatment	in	this	respect.	In	 terms	 of	 domestic	 law,	 a	 recent	 pronouncement	 by	 the	 SS.	 UU.	 of	 the	 Cassation,	 n.	19681	of	22	July	2019,	instead	contributed	to	establishing	the	relationship	between	the	right	to	 information	 and	 the	 right	 to	 privacy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 re-enactments	 of	 events	 that	occurred	a	considerable	distance	before	the	publication.		In	this	regard,	the	SC,	starting	from	the	distinction	between	reporting	law	and	historiographic	law,	has	established	that	while	the	legitimate	exercise	of	the	former	is	subject	to	the	traditional	criteria	already	operating	in	the	context	of	the	legal	system,	historiographic	law	can	be	correctly	exercised	only	in	the	case	in	which	to	which	the	facts	are	reported	in	compliance	with	the	right	to	anonymity.	In	particular	the	 SS.UU.	 stated	 that	 while	 the	 right	 of	 news	 has	 as	 its	 object	 the	 publication	 of	 current	affairs,	the	historiographic	law	is	characterized	by	having	as	its	object	facts	that	took	place	in	the	not	recent	past.	With	reference	to	the	latter	right,	i.e.	the	S.C.,	it	has	identified	a	particular	form	of	implementation	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	namely	the	use	of	anonymity,	which	in	the	
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balancing	 operated	 by	 the	 S.C.	 appears	 as	 a	 tool	 capable	 of	 combining	 the	 opposing	 needs	underlying	 the	 right	 to	 information	 and	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten.	 In	 any	 case,	 it	 must	 be	specified	 that	 the	 criterion	 identified	 by	 the	 S.C.	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 so-called	 right	compatible	historiographic	with	the	right	to	privacy	of	the	protagonists	of	the	facts	exposed,	refers	 to	 facts	 concerning	 ordinary	 people,	 whereas	 the	 right	 exercised	 by	 professional	historians,	having	as	its	object	past	facts	of	cultural	relevance,	does	not	underlie	and	this	limit	is	in	line	General	removed	from	the	application	of	the	legislation	on	the	protection	of	personal	data.	The	historiographic	 law	mentioned	by	 the	 sentence	of	 SS.	UU.	 should	not	be	 confused	with	the	right	of	historians	or	historians	in	the	strict	sense,	but	as	a	particular	type	of	right	to	information	 and	 as	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 right	 to	 report.	 The	 principle	 dictated	 by	 SS.	 UU	 is,	moreover,	 inapplicable	 to	 data	 concerning	well-known	 personalities,	 a	 category	 not	 drawn	from	 the	pronouncement	and	 for	which	 the	 traditional	 specific	discipline	already	envisaged	must	always	be	considered	effective,	especially	with	reference	to	the	particular	interpretation	to	which	the	notion	of	public	interest	in	the	case	is	subject.	The	sentence	of	SS.	UU.	in	question,	therefore,	identified	an	instrument	capable	of	making	the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 and	 the	 right	 to	 information	 coexist	with	 reference	 to	 events	 that	occurred	in	the	not	recent	past	and	not	concerning	known	personalities,	on	a	point	of		view	to	mutual	 compensation	 and	 not	 prevalence/succumb,	 according	 to	 which	 previously	 the	balance	 between	 the	 two	 opposing	 rights	 had	 been	 mostly	 achieved	 in	 relation	 to	 the	assumptions	of	the	individual	cases.		
The	right	to	be	forgotten	in	the	United	States		 Talking	about	the	right	to	be	forgotten	in	the	United	States	can	mean	referring	to	a	reality	that	 basically	 does	 not	 exist,	 or	 rather	 that	 is	 not	 found	 with	 the	 same	 connotations	 with	which	 it	 is	 instead	 known	 and	 operating	 in	 European	 systems.	 The	 reasons	 for	 this	 radical	difference	derive	from	mainly	cultural	factors,	by	virtue	of	which	the	very	concept	of	privacy	and	its	protection	differ	considerably	from	how	they	are	conceived	in	the	European	system.	In	the	United	States,	 the	concept	of	privacy	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 that	of	 freedom	and	 takes	on	a	much	 more	 political	 value	 than	 in	 Europe,	 as	 it	 is	 configured	 above	 all	 as	 a	 sphere	 of	protection	against	public	authorities	and	as	a	 limit	 to	 intervention	 in	private	 life	of	 citizens.	(Pagallo,	2008,	p.	40	s)	The	same	Privacy	Act	of	1974	is	a	federal-level	source	that	expressly	regulates	citizens'	right	to	privacy	towards	federal	agencies	and	their	political-administrative	activity.		The	prevailing	 idea	 of	 privacy	 in	 the	United	 States	 is	 therefore	mainly	 linked	 to	 that	 of	individual	freedom,	to	the	point	of	leaving	the	link	with	other	personal	assets	and	values	such	as	dignity	and	reputation	in	the	background.	Even	the	idea	of	privacy	is	therefore	conditioned	by	the	idea	of	freedom,	both	as	a	source	and	as	a	limit	of	the	right	in	question.	The	centrality	that	the	concept	of	 freedom	assumes	in	the	US	system	is	presented	above	all	 in	reference	to	the	freedom	of	expression,	which	in	that	system	assumes	a	practically	sacred	character.	The	
Freedom	of	Speech	represents	in	fact	one	of	the	founding	values	of	the	legal	and	constitutional	system	of	the	United	States,	finding	its	main	normative	expression	in	the	First	Amendment2	to	the	 Constitution	 which	 solemnly	 sanctions	 the	 prohibition	 for	 the	 Federal	 Government	 to	enact	any	measure,	even	the	least	restrictive,	of	the	freedom	of	the	press	and	speech,	as	well	
																																								 																				2	According	to	the	First	Amendment:	“Congress	shall	make	no	law	respecting	an	establishment	of	religion,	or	prohibiting	the	free	exercise	 thereof;	or	abridging	 the	 freedom	of	 speech,	or	of	 the	press;	or	 the	 right	of	 the	people	peaceably	 to	assemble,	 and	 to	petition	the	government	for	a	redress	of	grievances."	
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as	freedom	of	religion	and	worship.	This	last	element	is	significant	of	the	value	attributed	to	freedom	of	the	press	and	speech	in	the	United	States	system,	where	the	association	with	the	discipline	of	freedom	of	religion	and	worship	testifies	to	the	assimilation	of	the	two	goods	also	on	a	legal	level.	The	emphasis	placed	on	freedom	of	the	press	and	expression	can	only	reflect	on	the	scope	of	protection	concretely	ensured	to	the	right	to	privacy,	which	is	an	inherently	opposed	right	to	what	is	privileged	in	the	US	legal	system.	In	this	respect,	 it	 is	 interesting	to	note	 the	 apparent	 contradiction	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 right	 to	 privacy	 has	 had	 in	 the	country	in	which	it	first	saw	the	light,	compared	to	what	happened	in	Europe.	In	1890,	what	is	considered	to	be	the	first	work	in	which	the	scientific	foundations	of	the	right	to	privacy	were	laid	in	the	contemporary	era	was	published	in	the	Harvard	University	magazine,	the	essay	The	Right	to	Privacy	by	Samuel	D.	Warren	and	Louis	D.	Brandeis.	From	that	moment	on,	however,	the	evolution	of	the	concept	of	privacy	in	the	United	States	has	remained	linked	to	the	initial	idea	of	property	consisting	of	a	projection	of	the	right	of	property,	subsequently	understood	as	 a	 field	 of	 immunity	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 interference	 of	 public	 authorities,	 although	conditioned	by	the	already	structured	and	consolidated	system	of	rights	and	freedoms.	The	 prevalence	 accorded	 in	 the	 United	 States	 to	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 the	 press	 and	expression	has	determined	the	setting	of	protection	standards	that	are	considerably	different	than	 those	 envisaged	 within	 the	 legal	 systems	 of	 European	 countries	 and	 of	 the	 European	Union	itself.	This	element	is	not	only	a	factor	of	cognitive	interest,	but	has	also	been	the	cause	of	tensions	at	the	political	and	legal	level	between	the	United	States	and	Europe.	Following	the	ruling	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union	of	6	October	2015	 (called	 the	 sentence	Shrems	in	the	case	C-362/14)	the	agreement	entered	into	on	the	matter	between	the	United	States	 and	 Europe,	 called	 Safe	 Harbor	 had	 not	 in	 fact	 been	 deemed	 to	 comply	 with	 the	principles	 of	 European	 law	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 data,	 to	 because	 of	 insufficient	 guarantees	regarding	the	minimum	standards	of	protection	offered	by	the	US	system.	The	consequence	of	the	 ruling	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 was	 to	 determine	 the	 start	 of	 a	 long	 political-diplomatic	negotiation,	which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 new	 treaty,	 the	 Privacy	 Shield,	more	adherent	to	the	principles	of	European	law.	The	different	way	of	conceiving	the	protection	of	the	right	to	privacy	was	therefore	also	at	the	origin	of	the	aforementioned	political-diplomatic	dispute,	so	that	its	effects	are	not	likely	to	end	only	on	the	technical-legal	level,	but	also	come	to	affect	the	field	of	international	relations,	especially	in	the	current	era	characterized	by	the	globalization	of	economies	and	markets.		With	regard	to	the	more	strictly	legal	profile,	it	must	therefore	be	highlighted	that	in	the	United	States	there	is	no	notion	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	such	as	that	existing	in	European	law,	especially	at	the	level	of	jurisprudential	practice.	In	the	field	of	doctrine,	however,	also	as	a	consequence	of	the	influence	of	the	European	model	as	an	object	of	study	and	comparison,	the	concept	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	has	a	theorization	and	a	certain	depth,	although	it	 is	mainly	 seen	as	 an	 institution	belonging	 to	other	 legal	 systems.	The	eruption	of	 the	 internet	and	digital	technologies,	however,	have	also	imposed	greater	attention	in	the	United	States	on	the	issue	of	the	protection	of	personal	data,	especially	in	reference	to	the	periods	of	retention	of	the	same	online	and	the	possibility	of	exercising	control	over	the	dissemination	of	the	same,	especially	when	their	disclosure	does	not	correspond	to	needs	related	to	 the	right	 to	report	and	freedom	of	expression.	In	this	regard,	the	attention	of	the	doctrine	has	focused	above	all	on	the	classification	of	the	various	cases	attributable	to	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	in	particular	by	 making	 a	 broad	 distinction	 between	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 and	 right	 to	 erasure.	 The	distinction	is	made	substantially	on	the	basis	of	the	subject	that	gave	rise	to	the	dissemination	of	the	data,	with	the	right	to	be	forgotten	that	is	taken	into	consideration	whenever	it	concerns	data	 disclosed	 by	 third	 parties	with	 respect	 to	 the	 interested	 party	 and	mainly	 concerning	
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facts	of	 criminal	 relevance	committed	by	 the	same,	and	 the	right	 to	erasure	which	concerns	the	 cases	 in	which	 the	data	are	voluntarily	 communicated	 to	 third	parties	by	 the	 subject	 to	which	 they	 refer,	 although	 in	 a	 passive	 form	 as	 happens	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	contract.	At	 the	 doctrinal	 level,	 therefore,	 the	 critical	 issues	 that	 the	 second	 of	 the	 hypotheses	considered	 present	 for	 the	 interested	 party	 begin	 to	 be	 felt,	 given	 that	 in	 this	 case,	 in	hindsight,	it	is	not	a	question	of	limiting	or	conditioning	the	right	to	information	or	freedom	of	expression,	guarantee	the	possibility	of	exercising	personal	control	by	the	 latter	on	the	data	published	by	the	same,	also	through	the	form	of	cancellation.	In	this	sense,	the	right	to	erasure	is	not	considered	as	a	contrasting	element	with	the	system	of	 fundamental	rights	 in	force	 in	the	United	 States	 law,	 indeed	 it	 is	 considered	 an	 expression	 of	 that	 proprietary	 idea	 of	 the	right	to	privacy	that	still	characterizes	the	legal	thought	dominant	therein.	In	this	perspective,	the	interested	party	must	be	allowed	to	exercise	the	right	to	erase	the	data	communicated	by	him	and	processed	by	third	parties,	as	an	expression	of	a	power	of	disposition	that	assimilates	the	owner	of	personal	data	to	the	owner	of	tangible	and	non-tangible	assets.	In	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 US	 post-war	 system,	 there	 are	 no	 relevant	 examples	 of	 the	application	 of	 the	 right	 to	 oblivion,	which	was	mostly	 considered	 unsuccessful	 towards	 the	right	 to	 information,	with	 rare	 exceptions.	 	 By	way	 of	 example,	 the	Melvin	 v.	 Cases	we	 can	mention	Melvin	v.	Reid	(112	Cal.	App.	285,	297,	p.	91,	1931)	e	Sidis	v.	FR	Publishing	Corp	(311	U.S.	711	61	S.	Ct.	393	85	L.	Ed.	462	1940	U.S.)	cases.	The	first	case	concerned	an	ex-prostitute	who	had	been	 accused	of	 a	murder,	 but	 subsequently	 acquitted,	 and	whose	 story	had	been	taken	years	after	by	a	film	that	drew	inspiration	from	it.	In	the	meantime,	the	woman	had	put	aside	 the	 psychological	 discomfort	 generated	 by	 the	 traumatic	 affair	 and	 had	 attempted	 to	rebuild	a	new	 life	 in	 the	name	of	normality	and	serenity.	 	Therefore,	 the	Court	accepted	his	claim	for	compensation,	recognizing	his	claim	as	a	direct	expression	of	the	right	to	happiness	that	every	individual	living	in	righteousness	must	be	able	to	aspire	to	and	which	implies	the	legitimate	expectation	not	to	suffer	unnecessary	attacks	on	his	person	or	his	reputation.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 judgment	 rendered	 in	 the	 Sidis	 case	 was	 different,	 in	 which	 a	former	child	prodigy	who	became	an	adult	claimed	his	right	to	be	considered	normal,	after	a	newspaper	 years	 later	 reported	 his	 story	 talking	 about	 his	 particularities;	 in	 this	 case,	however,	the	judges	believed	that	it	was	not	founded	to	invoke	the	right	to	be	forgotten	as	it	may	never	entail	a	right	to	total	control	of	the	information	concerning	the	person	concerned,	especially	when	it	conflicts	with	the	requirements	of	the	right	of	news	and	of	press	freedom.	In	 essence,	 in	 the	 judgment	 in	 question,	 the	 judges	 argued	 that	 it	 should	 be	 a	 fact	 to	 be	tolerated	by	 the	person	concerned	 to	be	considered	a	celebrity.	The	 two	reported	cases	are	important,	 as	 they	 show	 the	 propensity	 of	 the	US	 legal	 system	 to	 recognize	 the	 right	 to	 be	forgotten	only	in	the	presence	of	serious	damage	to	the	reputation	of	the	person	concerned,	such	as	that	deriving	from	the	re-enactment	of	the	involvement	of	the	same	in	a	murder	trial,	although	the	latter	ended	with	the	acquittal	of	the	accused.	However,	the	idea	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	as	a	means	of	defending	the	identity	of	the	data	subject	in	the	round,	regardless	of	 the	 representation	 of	 facts	 damaging	 the	 reputation,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 different	 law,	does	 not	 yet	 seem	 to	 find	 space	 to	 the	mere	 social	 projection	 of	 the	 image	 that	 the	 person	concerned	 decides	 to	 give	 of	 his	 own	 person.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 claim	 by	 the	 interested	party	 to	 exercise	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 must	 instead	 confront	 in	 that	 system	 with	 the	scandalistic	 tendencies	of	a	 large	part	of	 the	American	press,	which	does	not	 fail	 to	disclose	with	extreme	ease	the	facts	and	aspects	related	to	the	more	intimate	life	of	people,	especially	when	it	comes	to	public	figures.	This	phenomenon	is	also	mostly	traced	back	to	the	coverage	provided	by	the	First	Amendment,	but	in	a	recent	case	that	has	caused	quite	a	stir,	the	reasons	
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for	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 the	 press	 have	 been	 sacrificed	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 needs	 to	 protect	privacy,	 and	 the	 privacy	 of	 the	 data	 subject.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 that	 saw	 the	 ex	wrestler	Hulk	Hogan	 opposed	 to	 the	 online	 newspaper	 Gawker3	 who	 had	 published	 a	 video	 with	 sexual	content	 concerning	 the	 character	 in	 question.	 The	 judgment	 that	 resulted	 from	 this	 affair	ended	with	 the	 online	 newspaper's	 sentencing	 to	 pay	 damages	 for	 a	 record	 $	 115	million.	Following	 this	 judgment,	 the	 online	 publication	 was	 subject	 to	 bankruptcy.	 Despite	 the	evident	 questionability	 of	 the	 facts	 covered	 by	 the	 video	 published,	 the	 case	 in	 question	certainly	marked	a	precedent	of	considerable	importance	in	the	defense	of	the	right	to	online	privacy	 and	 the	 right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 online	 in	 the	United	 States,	 coming	 to	 undermine	 the	principle	 of	 the	 general	 prevalence	 of	 press	 freedom	 very	 often	 applied	 in	 that	 order.	However,	 the	 results	 to	which	 this	 precedent	will	 lead	 are	 still	 uncertain,	 as	 the	 fate	 of	 the	right	 to	 be	 forgotten	 online	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 most	 recent	 jurisprudence	 is	uncertain,	especially	in	terms	of	the	effectiveness	and	concreteness	of	the	protection.		
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